EJUP GANIC & DOBROVOLJACKA STREET, WHAT REALLY HAPPENED?
Christian Schwarz-Schilling - former High Representative in BiH, and General Jovan Divjak - ethnic Serb who helped defend Sarajevo from the Serbian agression, speak about the events of 3 May 1992 ("Dobrovoljacka Street" incident) in Sarajevo.
PHOTO: Protesters on Thursday demonstrated in front of British and Serbian embassies in Sarajevo against Britain's arrest of a distinguished academic and former Vice-President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dr. Ejup Ganic.
BACKGROUND: The arrest of a distinguished academic and a war-time vice president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dr. Ejup Ganic, is a mockery of the British justice system. Dr. Ganic was arrested on a provisional extradition warrant based on a bilateral agreement signed between Serbia and United Kingdom in 2002. Serbia blames him for ordering an attack on a retreating column of Serbian soldiers in "Dobrovoljacka Street" in Sarajevo on 3 May 1992. Previous investigations by the Interpol and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia resulted in a dismissal of phony Serbian warrants.
Statement by Christian Schwarz-Schilling, Former High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina
The arrest of former member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr Ejup Ganić, by British authorities and in relation to the Serbian investigation into the 1992 attack on Yugoslav National Army convoy in Sarajevo, is a deeply disturbing development for several reasons.
This seems to be an attempt to manipulate history. The attack on Dobrovoljačka ulica in Sarajevo occured on 3 May 1992. The day before Sarajevo was the object of a full-scale offensive. The Main Post Office was hit and set on flames. The President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, returned from peace negotiations at Lisbon and was kidnapped by Serbian forces at Sarajevo airport. Ejup Ganić had to keep up the Presidency. The attack occured, as the commander of the "Yugoslav National Army" changed a pullback-agreement. The day after, again heavy shelling continued onto besieged Sarajevo. In the evening news, the liberated President Alija Izetbegović requested foreign military intervention "due to unending and persistent aggression on Bosnia and Hercegovina." But nothing happened.
Serbia's ongoing persistence in investigating this case in which the International War Crimes Tribunal has so far found no substantial evidence reflects Serbia's refusal to fully come to terms with its own role in the wars in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. It also reflects Serbia's continuous attempt to avert the blame for atrocities committed during the war and allocate some of the responsibility to other former Yugoslav republics.
Serbia's continued investigation into this case will keep on preventing Serbian people from coming to terms with their own recent history. The arrest of Ejup Ganić at London airport will continue preventing free travel of all people in the region and may result in similar countermeasures by other Balkan countries. Therefore the Serbian government's continued engagement in this case may continue destabilizing the region and working against Serbia's own interests. Only at the end of February, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have agreed that each state should investigate alleged war crimes committed by its own citizens. Serbia apparently breached this agreement immediately afterwards to continue pursuing its political campaign. Yet Serbia is not the only one to be blamed for this incident.
By arresting Ejup Ganić in London, Great Britain has unintentionally took part in the kidnapping of a distinguished Bosnian academic and participated in Serbia's political ploy. Furthermore, reportedly rude and unprofessional behavior of British authorities was in an open violation of most basic international legal principals, such as the Vienna Convention (Art. 36). It is unacceptable that an EU-member state is participating in this kind of political kidnapping.
To make the situation even worse, the arrest of Mr. Ganić came at the time when the Bosnian Serb war-time leader Radovan Karadžić started his defense before the Hague Tribunal, which to uninformed people may have looked like the two have been put onto the same level of moral judgment. But there is a huge difference between someone who was defending besieged Sarajevo and someone who was attacking this town and its civilian inhabitants day by day. We should not forsake the historical truth.
This unfortunate development must send a strong message to the top leaders of the Western powers to reconsider their attitudes towards remaining Balkan issues. Over the past months and years Western powers have been demanding from Balkan countries to develop principles of democracy, justice and good governance. Maybe it's time for the European Union to live up to
its own principles and show with its own good example how this is done.
Retired Bosnian Army General Jovan Divjak (ethnic Serb) who defended Sarajevo against the Serbian agression describes the events of 2 and 3 May in Sarajevo, in which he was a direct participant / Interviewed by Omer Karabeg of Radio Free Europe.
You told me just before this interview that what happened in Dobrovoljacka Street on 3 May cannot be viewed in isolation from what had happened in Sarajevo on the day before, 2 May.
JOVAN DIVJAK: 2 May was the day when the JNA [Yugoslav Peoples Army, aka: Serbian Army] tried to take control of the city. At that point in time, its six barracks were surrounded by our Territorial Defence, and it was expected that the JNA would leave Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina by the end of the month. An agreement had been reached at the end of April between the Bosnian presidency and the 2nd Army command, according to which JNA troops and vehicles, other than ambulances and vans supplying food to barracks lacking their own kitchens, were not allowed to move around in Sarajevo. Any other JNA vehicle had to get permission in advance. On 2 May at 3.30 o’clock in the morning the JNA started to shell the city. The shelling continued until 5 o’clock. They targeted the Presidency, the city centre, and the municipalities of Old Town and New Sarajevo. This was an artillery softening-up for the attack that was to follow. That same morning an act of sabotage also occurred at the Main Post Office on the Obala.
Do you know who did it?
JOVAN DIVJAK: There are various rumours, but we know it was an inside job. It was done by someone who worked in the post office. Some say it was done by Bosniaks, but it is more likely that it was done by a Serb employee and his circle. As a result 60,000 telephone lines in the Old Town went down, including the telephone link between the Main Staff of the Territorial Defence and its units. But to go back to what happened on 2 May. Two pinzgauers crossed the bridge at Skenderija. Some thought that they were going to the Presidency, others to the 2nd Army district headquarters to join up with the unit commanded by General Milutin Kukanjac. One of the transporters managed to reach the Estrada building, possibly in order to enforce a special police unit from Niš situated at the Army Hall. That day the police from Niš, commanded by Colonel Milan Šuput, after being expelled from the Army Hall, removed itself to the Bosnian Cultural Centre. A column of three transporters followed the pinzgauers, but when they saw that the latter had been set alight on the other side of the Skenderija bridge, along Valter Peric street, they turned towards the Television building.
Who resisted the armoured carriers?
JOVAN DIVJAK: Our tactical assault groups, made up of three or four Territorial Defence members armed with osa and zolja [hand-held anti-tank weapons] , and perhaps also mortars. One of the groups included Kerim Lucarevic and Muhamed Šišic-Dedo, another Mustafa Hajrulovic-Talijan. Dedo contrived a kind of steamroller to use against tanks. Two tanks had followed behind the transporters along the Zagrebacka street, but they also withdrew on learning that the pinzgauers had been destroyed. One of the tanks ran into a mine at the Jewish Cemetery, which damaged its tracks. The JNA sent a tank-tow which got it out and took it to Lukavica. The armoured vehicles had been sent out that morning from Lukavica, which housed the 1st armoured and mechanised brigade.
Did any JNA soldiers die on that occasion?
JOVAN DIVJAK: I know that the soldiers manning the transporters died. There were probably seven or eight in each vehicle. I don’t know the exact number. It is likely that those who accompanied the tanks died, at the Jewish Cemetery, in Zagrebacka street and along the stretch between Nedžaric and Television. Having met with resistance and being unable to realise its aim, at the end of that day of 2 May the JNA took Alija Izebegovic prisoner and held him in the barracks at Lukavica.
They had not expected such resistance?
JOVAN DIVJAK: No, they had not. The fact that they withdrew meant that they did not expect resistance. They played the card of surprise, it was meant to be a kind of small blitzkrieg, but as soon as they met with resistance they withdrew.
How did it go with Alija Izetbegovic?
You told me just before this interview that what happened in Dobrovoljacka Street on 3 May cannot be viewed in isolation from what had happened in Sarajevo on the day before, 2 May.
JOVAN DIVJAK: 2 May was the day when the JNA [Yugoslav Peoples Army, aka: Serbian Army] tried to take control of the city. At that point in time, its six barracks were surrounded by our Territorial Defence, and it was expected that the JNA would leave Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina by the end of the month. An agreement had been reached at the end of April between the Bosnian presidency and the 2nd Army command, according to which JNA troops and vehicles, other than ambulances and vans supplying food to barracks lacking their own kitchens, were not allowed to move around in Sarajevo. Any other JNA vehicle had to get permission in advance. On 2 May at 3.30 o’clock in the morning the JNA started to shell the city. The shelling continued until 5 o’clock. They targeted the Presidency, the city centre, and the municipalities of Old Town and New Sarajevo. This was an artillery softening-up for the attack that was to follow. That same morning an act of sabotage also occurred at the Main Post Office on the Obala.
Do you know who did it?
JOVAN DIVJAK: There are various rumours, but we know it was an inside job. It was done by someone who worked in the post office. Some say it was done by Bosniaks, but it is more likely that it was done by a Serb employee and his circle. As a result 60,000 telephone lines in the Old Town went down, including the telephone link between the Main Staff of the Territorial Defence and its units. But to go back to what happened on 2 May. Two pinzgauers crossed the bridge at Skenderija. Some thought that they were going to the Presidency, others to the 2nd Army district headquarters to join up with the unit commanded by General Milutin Kukanjac. One of the transporters managed to reach the Estrada building, possibly in order to enforce a special police unit from Niš situated at the Army Hall. That day the police from Niš, commanded by Colonel Milan Šuput, after being expelled from the Army Hall, removed itself to the Bosnian Cultural Centre. A column of three transporters followed the pinzgauers, but when they saw that the latter had been set alight on the other side of the Skenderija bridge, along Valter Peric street, they turned towards the Television building.
Who resisted the armoured carriers?
JOVAN DIVJAK: Our tactical assault groups, made up of three or four Territorial Defence members armed with osa and zolja [hand-held anti-tank weapons] , and perhaps also mortars. One of the groups included Kerim Lucarevic and Muhamed Šišic-Dedo, another Mustafa Hajrulovic-Talijan. Dedo contrived a kind of steamroller to use against tanks. Two tanks had followed behind the transporters along the Zagrebacka street, but they also withdrew on learning that the pinzgauers had been destroyed. One of the tanks ran into a mine at the Jewish Cemetery, which damaged its tracks. The JNA sent a tank-tow which got it out and took it to Lukavica. The armoured vehicles had been sent out that morning from Lukavica, which housed the 1st armoured and mechanised brigade.
Did any JNA soldiers die on that occasion?
JOVAN DIVJAK: I know that the soldiers manning the transporters died. There were probably seven or eight in each vehicle. I don’t know the exact number. It is likely that those who accompanied the tanks died, at the Jewish Cemetery, in Zagrebacka street and along the stretch between Nedžaric and Television. Having met with resistance and being unable to realise its aim, at the end of that day of 2 May the JNA took Alija Izebegovic prisoner and held him in the barracks at Lukavica.
They had not expected such resistance?
JOVAN DIVJAK: No, they had not. The fact that they withdrew meant that they did not expect resistance. They played the card of surprise, it was meant to be a kind of small blitzkrieg, but as soon as they met with resistance they withdrew.
Taking Alija Izetbegovic prisoner
How did it go with Alija Izetbegovic?
He was seized when he landed at the Sarajevo airport on his return from the negotiations in Lisbon. There is a story which I am sure Lagumdžija would tell you. He says that during the flight he tried to persuade Izetbegovic to land not in Sarajevo but in Split [Croatia], which would be safer. Alija replied that he had a JNA guarantee he could freely land. When we in the Main Staff of the Territorial Defence learned that Izetbegovic had been captured, we became greatly concerned. We feared that they would use physical pressure against him, drug him to get him to sign something. This is what we in the Main Staff were thinking. what was going through our minds. We even considered attacking the Lukavica barracks, which would have been a crazy thing to do, because we had nothing but rifles, a few machine-guns and some anti-tank weapons. Such weapons cannot be used against a heavily armed fortress full of tanks and artillery.
I did not know what was happening at the Presidency, what Sefer Halilovic [of the Patriotic League] and Colonel Hasan Efendic [of the Territorial Defence] were doing. At that time there still existed a dual command, despite the fact that the Patriotic League had joined the Territorial Defence on 14 April. The commander of the Patriotic League, Sefer Halilovic, joined the Main Staff after the League had fused with the Territorial Defence and became head of its operational section.
We of the Staff were carefully monitoring developments. We learnt that Izetbegovic was to arrive in an armoured vehicle at the 2nd Army district building, which we had surrounded, to be exchanged there for the commander of the 2nd Army district, General Kukanjac. We did not know whether Izetbegovic would really be exchanged, or whether it was simply a trap. It was therefore necessary to check whether he was in the vehicle. We decided to do so near the Cobanija mosque. When I got there three Territorials, who were at Cobanija, told me that the column had passed by long ago and had already arrived at the 2nd Army district command, so I set off for 6 April Square, where I found around thirty vehicles.
The soldiers were taking wooden boxes from the building, which we later learnt contained archives. They carried personal weapons. I did not notice any of them carrying a machine-gun or mortar. Standing round them in the square were about a hundred Territorials, policemen from the Old Town, and many other people unknown to me, who belonged to various groups from the Old Town. Their intention was to attack the soldiers. One could hear football-style chanting coming from the nearby streets and courtyards: ‘Go on! Forward!’ I tried to calm them down, and through a loud speaker invited the JNA soldiers to join our side, where they would enjoy all rights. We wrote into our Law on National Defence that all those who joined us would retain their rights and their rank, and even that those with the rank of major could be promoted to that of lieutenant-colonel. Coffee was made, pies offered to the members of the Territorial Defence. Everyone was waiting, as if in an arena, for something to happen. I could not establish contact with the Main Staff and the Presidency, my walkie-talkie was not working. Then a young man rushed up to me and said: ‘Comrade colonel, I’m a radio ham, let’s try to establish contact through the radio hams.’ I went to his place and after half an hour of fiddling we managed to establish the link.
I returned to the square, but the soldiers had left. I went to Cobanija. It was between 5 and 5.30 in the afternoon, I don’t recall exactly the time. I came across a column that had halted. A small four-wheel car was at the front, with General Lewis Mackenzie and Lagumdžija. Behind it was an armoured carrier with Izetbegovic and Kukanjac. This vehicle was surrounded by security guards. I climbed into it. Izetbegovic said to me: ‘Jovan, I don’t know why the column has been stopped. All has been agreed. Please make sure the column can pass.’
At that moment I heard shooting some 200 to 300 metres further along, somewhere in the direction of Drvenija. I screamed: ‘Don’t shoot!’
Zoran Cegar turned up at that moment, a policeman from the special unit led by Dragan Vikic. He said: ‘Get down! Who are you? This is my president. What business do you have with him?’ I got down. He talked to the president, I could not hear what they were saying. I saw him getting down and opening the door of the transporter. This is the first time I saw Kukanjac cringe in fear, becoming very small. Cegar told him: ‘Your Chetnik mother! If something were to happen to Alija Izetbegovic, your whole Chetnik family will be a head shorter.’ All this took place in Dobrovoljacka Street, along from the Theatre Café towards Drvenija. At that moment the column was allowed to proceed, I don’t know by whose order.
Was there more shooting?
JOVAN DIVJAK: I heard shooting only once more from the direction of Drvenija. The column moved on, fifteen vehicles followed the transporter with Alija Izetbegovic, while our side took fifteen others as war booty. They jumped on and turned them towards Cobanija, and took them from there through the nearby streets. These trucks contained on average one or two soldiers. It was later said that many documents were found in these trucks, including a plan for capturing Sarajevo within seven and Bosnia-Herzegovina within thirty days. I did not see them myself. Two hundred and fifteen soldiers were captured on this occasion and taken to the FIS [sports] building. They were kept there for two days. Stjepan Šiber was instructed to talk to them, to invite them to stay with us in the Territorial Defence, or if not to tell them that they could return to their units, that they could be exchanged. This is what I personally saw. It would be wrong of me to comment on things I did not witness.
Eight people died on Dobrovoljacka Street
How many people died?
JOVAN DIVJAK: As far as I know, eight people were killed.
Do you know who started shooting?
JOVAN DIVJAK: That I don’t know.
Why did people shoot?
JOVAN DIVJAK: I don’t know that either. I think that no one gave the order, that it was done by individuals acting on their own. I heard later a soldier who was there say: ‘Some madman took a gun and fired at the window of a bus carrying army officers.’ I didn’t witness that, it’s what a man who was there said. He also said: ‘An old man took a gun and fired.’
Who on Dobrovoljacka Street took part in the shooting? Which units were there?
JOVAN DIVJAK: I couldn’t tell who was with which unit. The fact is that the streets of the Old Town were pretty full of policemen and Green Beret members. The Territorial Defence also operated in groups. They were not full units. Each would have about a dozen Territorials, and two dozen policemen and Green Berets. They were all mixed, you couldn’t tell who belonged to which unit. Only around ten per cent of the men wore a uniform. It was mainly civilians who were in the street on that day.
Were they deployed on both sides of Dobrovoljacka Street? Were they expecting the passing of the column?
JOVAN DIVJAK: They were indeed, because they had followed the column as it set off from 6 April Square. I didn’t see many people at the place where I was, they were largely Alija Izetnegovic’s security guards.
There was no torture
Do you know if the wounded received medical care in the Sarajevo hospitals?
JOVAN DIVJAK: Sure they did. Colonel Enes Taso, who was badly wounded, was taken to a hospital where he received medical treatment. He was later transferred to Belgrade where he gained the rank of general. He was an ethnic Bosniak.
There are stories about people being tortured at FIS.
That should be said by witnesses. I know from talking to my friend Šiber that there was no torture.
Would it have been possible for someone from the Presidency to have planned all this in advance, to have deployed members of the Territorial Defence, Patriotic League and Green Berets along Dobrovoljacka Street and given them an order to attack?
JOVAN DIVJAK: That’s impossible, because each group operated on its own. They were all mixed up, so that it’s impossible that someone could have directly influenced their deployment along the stretch between the 2nd Army district and Drvenija. That’s not possible, it couldn’t be done.
You believe that there was no order to attack, that it happened spontaneously?
JOVAN DIVJAK: Absolutely spontaneously.
Could it have been avoided?
JOVAN DIVJAK: Of course. Why did the JNA attack Sarajevo on 2 May? What was the JNA doing in Sarajevo on 2 May? It was a general test to see how the Territorial Defence, police and others would react. They did not have to arrest Alija Izetbegovic. None of this would have happened if Izetbegovic not been taken prisoner. Were it not for this, I am certain that after a while and through negotiations the siege of all the barracks would have been lifted without a shot being fired.
So, according to you, it was not organised?
JOVAN DIVJAK: I was there and saw that it was not organised. I repeat, some people did try to attack the JNA. They were saying: ‘Let’s go, let’s move, let’s proceed bit by bit.’ It was not a command. The commanding officers’ command was: ‘Don’t go, wait, don’t attack, don’t shoot.’ The commanders of the basic units tried to prevent shooting. If someone wished for a massacre to occur, it would have happened at 6 April Square.
Who in your view is responsible for Dobrovoljacka?
JOVAN DIVJAK: Those who gave themselves the right to decide who would die.
Do you think that what happened on Dobrovoljacka Street was a crime?
JOVAN DIVJAK: At the individual level, it was. But at the general level it was not committed by the regular units of the Territorial Defence, police or Green Berets.
I did not know what was happening at the Presidency, what Sefer Halilovic [of the Patriotic League] and Colonel Hasan Efendic [of the Territorial Defence] were doing. At that time there still existed a dual command, despite the fact that the Patriotic League had joined the Territorial Defence on 14 April. The commander of the Patriotic League, Sefer Halilovic, joined the Main Staff after the League had fused with the Territorial Defence and became head of its operational section.
We of the Staff were carefully monitoring developments. We learnt that Izetbegovic was to arrive in an armoured vehicle at the 2nd Army district building, which we had surrounded, to be exchanged there for the commander of the 2nd Army district, General Kukanjac. We did not know whether Izetbegovic would really be exchanged, or whether it was simply a trap. It was therefore necessary to check whether he was in the vehicle. We decided to do so near the Cobanija mosque. When I got there three Territorials, who were at Cobanija, told me that the column had passed by long ago and had already arrived at the 2nd Army district command, so I set off for 6 April Square, where I found around thirty vehicles.
The soldiers were taking wooden boxes from the building, which we later learnt contained archives. They carried personal weapons. I did not notice any of them carrying a machine-gun or mortar. Standing round them in the square were about a hundred Territorials, policemen from the Old Town, and many other people unknown to me, who belonged to various groups from the Old Town. Their intention was to attack the soldiers. One could hear football-style chanting coming from the nearby streets and courtyards: ‘Go on! Forward!’ I tried to calm them down, and through a loud speaker invited the JNA soldiers to join our side, where they would enjoy all rights. We wrote into our Law on National Defence that all those who joined us would retain their rights and their rank, and even that those with the rank of major could be promoted to that of lieutenant-colonel. Coffee was made, pies offered to the members of the Territorial Defence. Everyone was waiting, as if in an arena, for something to happen. I could not establish contact with the Main Staff and the Presidency, my walkie-talkie was not working. Then a young man rushed up to me and said: ‘Comrade colonel, I’m a radio ham, let’s try to establish contact through the radio hams.’ I went to his place and after half an hour of fiddling we managed to establish the link.
I returned to the square, but the soldiers had left. I went to Cobanija. It was between 5 and 5.30 in the afternoon, I don’t recall exactly the time. I came across a column that had halted. A small four-wheel car was at the front, with General Lewis Mackenzie and Lagumdžija. Behind it was an armoured carrier with Izetbegovic and Kukanjac. This vehicle was surrounded by security guards. I climbed into it. Izetbegovic said to me: ‘Jovan, I don’t know why the column has been stopped. All has been agreed. Please make sure the column can pass.’
At that moment I heard shooting some 200 to 300 metres further along, somewhere in the direction of Drvenija. I screamed: ‘Don’t shoot!’
Zoran Cegar turned up at that moment, a policeman from the special unit led by Dragan Vikic. He said: ‘Get down! Who are you? This is my president. What business do you have with him?’ I got down. He talked to the president, I could not hear what they were saying. I saw him getting down and opening the door of the transporter. This is the first time I saw Kukanjac cringe in fear, becoming very small. Cegar told him: ‘Your Chetnik mother! If something were to happen to Alija Izetbegovic, your whole Chetnik family will be a head shorter.’ All this took place in Dobrovoljacka Street, along from the Theatre Café towards Drvenija. At that moment the column was allowed to proceed, I don’t know by whose order.
Was there more shooting?
JOVAN DIVJAK: I heard shooting only once more from the direction of Drvenija. The column moved on, fifteen vehicles followed the transporter with Alija Izetbegovic, while our side took fifteen others as war booty. They jumped on and turned them towards Cobanija, and took them from there through the nearby streets. These trucks contained on average one or two soldiers. It was later said that many documents were found in these trucks, including a plan for capturing Sarajevo within seven and Bosnia-Herzegovina within thirty days. I did not see them myself. Two hundred and fifteen soldiers were captured on this occasion and taken to the FIS [sports] building. They were kept there for two days. Stjepan Šiber was instructed to talk to them, to invite them to stay with us in the Territorial Defence, or if not to tell them that they could return to their units, that they could be exchanged. This is what I personally saw. It would be wrong of me to comment on things I did not witness.
Eight people died on Dobrovoljacka Street
How many people died?
JOVAN DIVJAK: As far as I know, eight people were killed.
Do you know who started shooting?
JOVAN DIVJAK: That I don’t know.
Why did people shoot?
JOVAN DIVJAK: I don’t know that either. I think that no one gave the order, that it was done by individuals acting on their own. I heard later a soldier who was there say: ‘Some madman took a gun and fired at the window of a bus carrying army officers.’ I didn’t witness that, it’s what a man who was there said. He also said: ‘An old man took a gun and fired.’
Who on Dobrovoljacka Street took part in the shooting? Which units were there?
JOVAN DIVJAK: I couldn’t tell who was with which unit. The fact is that the streets of the Old Town were pretty full of policemen and Green Beret members. The Territorial Defence also operated in groups. They were not full units. Each would have about a dozen Territorials, and two dozen policemen and Green Berets. They were all mixed, you couldn’t tell who belonged to which unit. Only around ten per cent of the men wore a uniform. It was mainly civilians who were in the street on that day.
Were they deployed on both sides of Dobrovoljacka Street? Were they expecting the passing of the column?
JOVAN DIVJAK: They were indeed, because they had followed the column as it set off from 6 April Square. I didn’t see many people at the place where I was, they were largely Alija Izetnegovic’s security guards.
There was no torture
Do you know if the wounded received medical care in the Sarajevo hospitals?
JOVAN DIVJAK: Sure they did. Colonel Enes Taso, who was badly wounded, was taken to a hospital where he received medical treatment. He was later transferred to Belgrade where he gained the rank of general. He was an ethnic Bosniak.
There are stories about people being tortured at FIS.
That should be said by witnesses. I know from talking to my friend Šiber that there was no torture.
Would it have been possible for someone from the Presidency to have planned all this in advance, to have deployed members of the Territorial Defence, Patriotic League and Green Berets along Dobrovoljacka Street and given them an order to attack?
JOVAN DIVJAK: That’s impossible, because each group operated on its own. They were all mixed up, so that it’s impossible that someone could have directly influenced their deployment along the stretch between the 2nd Army district and Drvenija. That’s not possible, it couldn’t be done.
You believe that there was no order to attack, that it happened spontaneously?
JOVAN DIVJAK: Absolutely spontaneously.
Could it have been avoided?
JOVAN DIVJAK: Of course. Why did the JNA attack Sarajevo on 2 May? What was the JNA doing in Sarajevo on 2 May? It was a general test to see how the Territorial Defence, police and others would react. They did not have to arrest Alija Izetbegovic. None of this would have happened if Izetbegovic not been taken prisoner. Were it not for this, I am certain that after a while and through negotiations the siege of all the barracks would have been lifted without a shot being fired.
So, according to you, it was not organised?
JOVAN DIVJAK: I was there and saw that it was not organised. I repeat, some people did try to attack the JNA. They were saying: ‘Let’s go, let’s move, let’s proceed bit by bit.’ It was not a command. The commanding officers’ command was: ‘Don’t go, wait, don’t attack, don’t shoot.’ The commanders of the basic units tried to prevent shooting. If someone wished for a massacre to occur, it would have happened at 6 April Square.
Who in your view is responsible for Dobrovoljacka?
JOVAN DIVJAK: Those who gave themselves the right to decide who would die.
Do you think that what happened on Dobrovoljacka Street was a crime?
JOVAN DIVJAK: At the individual level, it was. But at the general level it was not committed by the regular units of the Territorial Defence, police or Green Berets.
posted by Srebrenica Genocide at 8:10 PM
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Update: Ejup Ganic must remain in a British prison for at least two more days following his arrest on phony Serbian war crimes charges, a judge said Tuesday.
"We were really encouraged by today's hearing because the court seemed to accept our arguments that the arrest warrant is at the very least faulty," Ganic's daughter Emina told reporters after the hearing.
"We now feel we have some chance of getting out of this Kafka novel that we are trapped in," she said, referring to Franz Kafka's "The Trial," a novel about a man caught in an unending legal limbo.
Strongly recommended read:
Ejup Ganic meets Franz Kafka.
Update 2: "Ganic, who is a close friend of several British politicians, including former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, has hired a team of prominent British lawyers.
John Jones specialises in extradition law, war crimes and counter-terrorism. He has appeared as counsel before a number of international courts and tribunals, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY, in the case of Naser Oric, a former commander of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Srebrenica.
Jones was also on the defence team of Mehmed Alagic, a former general in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rasim Delic, the highest ranking officer of the Army to be indicted by the ICTY.
He also worked as a law clerk and associate legal officer to Judge Antonio Cassese, the first president of the ICTY.
Clare Montgomery is a prominent UK lawyer. She represented former Chilean leader General Pinochet in the House of Lords, among other major cases, and she is considered to be an expert in extradition."
Read more @ Balkan Insight
Update 3: Today, Ejup Ganic was released on bail.
Update 4: According to Ejup Ganic's legal adviser Damir Arnaut, the so called evidence against Ejup Ganic consists of 12 pages - 10 of which are various newspaper clippings inadmissable in court! (source)
Who is behind this circus? It's genocide denying Serbian ultranationalist group headed by Darko Trifunovic and mascaraded as the "Belgrade Law Project Centre."
This is making my blood boil right now. I just read an article that was clearly very biased, and was written without any explanation of what Ganic is accused of, yet his crimes were compared to that of Karadzic. If someone not educated on the matter was to just read this article, they would get that idea of equality between crimes from both sides:
Outside court Thursday, a small group of mostly elderly anti-Ganic protesters held placards reading "British justice, don't wobble" and "Ganic: blood on his hands".
Luba Novak, a Serb woman living in London, claimed: "There is no doubt that Ganic gave the order to attack the wounded soldiers.
"If he is not extradited it is just more proof that Bosnians are treated differently to Serbs.
"Ganic is worse than (Radovan) Karadzic. Karadzic didn't order the murder of anyone," she said, referring to the former Bosnian Serb leader, on trial in a UN war crimes court in The Hague.
The legal situations of Ganic and Kardzic are so extremely different that I think it's absurd to even mention the two in the same article without explanation of what they are accused of to the audience.
Karadzic = extradited by the International Court of Justice = alleged killing of thousands of civilians.
Ganic =cleared of his crimes by international court and now accused by Serbia (the country basically on trial for genocide in front of the world) of attack on solders who were attacking civilians in his own country????
I can see what makes some of our people not want to even deal with this crap, it's like they have to go through the same crap all over again, even though all of the world knew exactly what was happening during the war.
And the serb protesters at his trial? I don't understand how they are not ashamed of themselves to the point where they are hiding in their houses, and not doing something as ridiculous as going out to protest against Ganic. Nice job from this author for only getting the comments from the Serbs.
And I don't get it...once they do determine that Serbia had no evidence to arrest him, then what??? Do the British just say "oh sorry for holding you in jail for 10 days even though we had no evidence"?
They don't want to arrest Karadzic for 13 years, yet they just go and arrest Ganic without any proof as soon as Serbia wants it??
Dear kanita,
I don't even want to comment on what these elderly Serbian fascists said about a respected academic Ejub Ganic and a cowardly war criminal Radovan Karadzic.
As I mentioned in my previous comment, the so called 'evidence' against Ejup Ganic consists of 12 pages - 10 of which are various newspaper clippings. This phony evidence has been compiled by Dr. Darko Trifunovic and possibly his assistant Jill Star, who was recently released from a prison / mental institution. It's a long story, but if Owen joins this discussion, I am sure he will drop more info. Trifunovic's caliber of expertise is on a level of a pre-school toddler.
The arrest of Ejup Ganic is, in a way, a good thing. It re-asserts our authority and it re-activates our lobby groups across the World. Bosniak activist Sanela Diana Jenkins paid £300,000 for Ejup Ganic's bail. Many of our organizations across the World protested Ganic's arrest. Bosniaks are suddenly becoming so passionate about Bosnia - as they should be. And Serbs are biting their fingers in anger - as they should. You see, it feels good to "stick it to them", it makes my day when I see that Serbs lose. I will put a huge smile on my face when the judge throws this phony evidence against Ganic, and nobody in Europe will ever again take Serbian warrants seriously. Remember, Interpol refused these phony warrants and the Hague Tribunal cleared Ganic of any wrongdoing. The public opinion and the facts of this case are heavily in favor of Ejup Ganic. Serbs are losers. We will win again. Serbs are not worthy opponents, they are weak, irrelevant, and they always lose.
Wow, I truly look up to that woman. She doesn't have to do anything, yet she does so much and is proud of her roots. For a split second I actually thought it was her who paid the bail when I read the earlier articles that didn't disclose the name.
What you said definitely calmed me down a bit, and you are right that there are definite advantages to what happened with Ganic.
What I don't get, and maybe it's cause I still don't know enough about this incident...but I was under the impression that the country of Serbia is still maintaining their innocence in the war - basically that they had nothing to do with what the Bosnian Serbs did and that Milosevic didn't give any orders ( ie that what happened in Bosnia was a civil war between Serbs and Bosniaks of Bosnia)...so then how can they be issuing arrest warrants for an incident that they had nothing to do with in Bosnia?
kanita, don't make mistake about it - we do have influence all the way to the White House. Serbs are nothing, they are irrelevant, they have lost their credibility and will never regain it.
Yesterday, the delegation of the Congress of North American Bosniaks met with the U.S. State Department to protest the arrest of Dr. Ejub Ganic, read here (it should be available in English in a day or two).
And yes, Sanela Diana Catic - a friend of this blog - paid bail for Dr. Ganic. Owen disclosed this 'secret' on March 4th (see comments), a week before the media jumped on it with a breaking story.
kanita asked: "but I was under the impression that the country of Serbia is still maintaining their innocence in the war."
They are not innocent. The ICJ ruled that Serbia provided moral, financial, logistical, and military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs. What "we" couldn't prove is Serbia's direct involvement in the Srebrenica Genocide. However, since the ICJ verdict, new evidence resurfaced. Please take a look:
1. Has evidence against Serbia come too late?
2. Scorpions were part of Serbian State Security Service (DB)
kanita asked: "so then how can they be issuing arrest warrants for an incident that they had nothing to do with in Bosnia?"
They can't. Let me quote Ganic's lawyer:
"Referring to what the defence calls one of the mistakes in the warrant, Clair Montgomery, one of Ganic's attorneys, mentioned in the Magistrate Court hearing on March 9 that the warrant said that the crime was committed in Serbia in the first paragraph, while in the second paragraph says that the crime was committed in Sarajevo."
Now, take a look at this 'warrant' for Ganic's arrest which claims that Sarajevo is in Serbia! It's laughable!
Kanita, I hope we can be reassured by the use of the word "elderly" to describe the protesters outside the High Court. During the 1992-1995 war the Serb lobby in the UK were able to muster younger supporters as well. Now I guess the young Serbians in London are more interested in the business of making money/earning a living.
If Dan is right and this is Darko Trifunovic at work, I think Bosnia may be able to relax a bit. Trifunovic will be recognised by many of the visitors to this blog as the individual responsible for compiling the ludicrous Republika Srpska Report on Case Srebrenica of 2002, which calculated the probable number of victims of genocide as less than a hundred.
That report was characteristic of Trifunovic's efforts. If there's an opportunity to over-egg the cake he'll go out and buy a dozen laying geese. The RS Report was so ludicrous that Paddy Ashdown threw it out and demanded that RS came up with something serious.
This has superficially been a rather more successful coup, but I wonder whether opportunism and their innate sense of intellectual superiority may once again have got the better of the Karadzic defence team.
Newspaper cutting evidence certainly suggests Trifunovic's subtle touch at work, but even if there's some more sophisticated Belgrade intellect at work providing a more cogent case to follow up, clearly this case is going to end up as (is already) a very embarrassing mess for the British government. Assuming HMG still have some capacity to learn from experience I think it's likely that they will be a lot more careful before getting involved in any more madcap Serbian schemes in the future.
Kanita, if you can bear to experience the sort of wonderland that the Crime Protection Lobby
inhabitant when not subverting the factual evidence, try out Jill Starr's account of her life and times with Trifunovic and his friends.
http://lpcyu.instablogs.com/entry/updated-edition-of-mladic-karadzic-book/
Starr writes rather well. She doesn't seem to have managed to communicate her intellectual and literary fluency to her former associate, though they do seem to share the same rather florid imagination.
The key question is why serious people with blood up to their wrists and elbows have chosen to involve these people in their desperate publicity campaigns. Any noise is good noise?
(Incidentally I have no claim to privileged access to information about either Jill Starror Sanela Catic Jenkins. For some reason information that is generally available takes a long time to get through to the people whose job it is to locate it. Perhaps the problems facing investigative journalists are similar to those facing the people responsible for scrutinising international arrest warrants?)
Daniel, the idea of suggesting that Sarajevo was in Serbia is a real signal of Trifunovic's the involvement.
For years we had to endure the ineffable superiority of the Belgrade intellectual snobbocracy who claimed that we poor Westerners never had a hope of understanding the complexities of Balkan issues - trust me, I'm a used car salesman with a PhD.
Now these supremely clever people have entrusted the defence strategy of their abattoir manager to people who seem ready to squander their most precious resources at the first opportunity.
If you want to make best use of a simple dupe, you don't expose their incompetence to the full glare of international media atttention the first time you use them.
Trifunovic may have "clever" ideas, but by now you would have though that someone in Belgrade/Banja Luka might have guessed what sort of a mess the sorcerer's apprentice is likely to cook up in the kitchen without supervision.
Hopefully in the long run the opportunistic ploy of pursuing this incompetent warrant will turn out to have been one of the most effective contributions to ensuring that when Karadzic goes down Mladic is left with nowhere, not even Serbia, to find shelter.
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